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SUMMARY 
The Zuma case - important as the first decision of the Constitutional Court - is primarily 
concerned with the constitutionality of section 217(l)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
In trying to fmd an answer to this question, the Constitutional Court also addressed other 
important issues. 
In this dissertation the Constitutional Court's decision on the constitutionality of section 
217(1)(b)(ii) is examined, as well as important general principles laid down by the Court 
regarding incompetent referrals by the Supreme Court; constitutional interpretation; reverse 
onus provisions and the right to a fair trial; as well as the application of the general limitation 
clause. 
A closer look is taken at adherence to these principles in subsequent Constitutional Court 
decisions, and finally a conclusion is reached on the value of the Zuma case. 
(Constitutional Court decisions; constitutional jurisdiction; constitutional interpretation; 
reverse onus provisions; right to a fair trial; general limitation clause) 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The Zuma1 case was the first case to come before the Constitutional Court and, as such, has 
attracted considerable attention. 2 
In this case the Constitutional Court was primarily concerned with the constitutionality of 
section 217(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which dealt with the 
admissibility in evidence of a confession made by an accused before trial. The court found 
this section to be unconstitutional. Although this is an important issue, the greater 
significance of the Zuma case lies in the fact that it was the Constitutional Court's and 
therefore sets the tone for subsequent judgments. 
The judgment has already made itself felt in the way in which the Constitutional Court and 
other courts approach interpretation of the Interim Constitution. The effect of the Zuma 
judgment on the wording of the jurisdictional clauses in the final constitution should also not 
be underestimated. 
For the purposes of this discussion, the following principal issues arising from Zuma will be 
considered: 
* referral to the Constitutional Court 
* constitutional interpretation 
* reverse onus and fair trial 
* the limitation clause 
z 
S v Zuma 1995(4) BCLR 401 SA (CC). 
A few commentaries have already appeared on this case (see eg, Ecasmus, G "'lbe first judgment of 
the Constitutional Court: What does it tell us?" 1995 SA Public Law 215; Ecasmus, G and Strydom, 
H "Judgments on the Constitution and fundamental rights" 1995 2SUll LR 264; and Olivier, D "Eerste 
uitspraak van die Konstitusiooele Hof" 1995 De Rebus 347), and it has been referred to in a number' 
of subsequent Constitutional Court decisions (eg, S v Mhlungu 1995(7) BCLR 793 (CC); S v Vermaas; 
S v DuPlessis 1995(7) BCLR 851 (CC); S v Zantsi CCf/24194; S v Williams 1995(7) BCLR 861 (CC) 
and S v Makwanyane 1995(6) BCLR 665 (CC)). 
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2 GENERAL BACKGROUND TO THE ZUMA CASE 
In the Zuma case, two accused appearing before the Natal Provincial Division of the Supreme 
Court3 on two counts of murder and one of robbery, had made statements before a 
magistrate. The admissibility of these statements was contested by the defence, which led 
to a trial-within-a-trial during which the defence questioned the constitutionality of section 
217(1)(b)(ii). 4 
According to the accused they had made the statements after being assaulted by the police. 
Two women called as witnesses testified that they saw the police assaulting the accused. 
After all the evidence had been heard, the court concluded that, although it was not satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the statements had been "freely and voluntarily" made, the 
accused had not managed to discharge the onus on them in terms of subsection (b) on a 
balance of probabilities. Had it not been for the doubt surrounding the constitutionality of 
section 217(1)(b)(ii), it would have been a simple case of accepting that having failed to 
discharge the onus the accuseds' statements would be admissible. 
The constitutionality of section 217(1)(b)(ii) was therefore of crucial importance to the 
outcome of the case. Hugo J refrained from addressing the issue, and referred it to the 
Constitutional Court. At the same time, the Attorney-General of Natal also referred the 
3 S v Zuma 1995(1) BCLR 49 (N). 
S 217(l)(b)(ii) reads as follows: 
"Provided-
(b) that where the confession is made to a magistrate and reduced to writing by him, or is 
~mned and reduced to writing in the presence of a magistrate, the confession shall, upon 
the mere production thecoof at the proceedings in question -
(ii) be presumed, unless the contrary is proved, to have been freely and voluntarily made 
by such pecson in his sound and sobec senses and without having been unduly 
influenced thereto if it appears from the document in which the confession is 
contained that the confession was made freely and voluntarily by such pecson in his 
sound and sobec senses and without having been unduly influenced thereto." 
2 
constitutionality of section 217(1)(b)(ii) to the Constitutional Court, as a matter of public 
interest. This proved to be the decisive factor in the Court's decision to hear the case. 
Zuma is the ftrst in a series of Constitutional Court decisions dealing with incompetent 
referrals and this is the ftrst matter which will be addressed. 
3 REFERRAL TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL COURT 
AB it the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament was in question, the Zuma case dealt with 
an issue falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Constitutional Court. Both parties to 
the dispute consented, however, to the jurisdiction of the Natal Provincial Division of the 
Supreme Court under section 101 (6), making it possible for the Supreme Court to decide this 
issue. AB already stated, 5 Hugo J chose rather to refer this matter to the Constitutional 
Court, despite the fact that the Natal Provincial Division of the Supreme Court had the 
necessary jurisdiction to hear the case. This resulted in the referral being labelled 
"incompetent". 
It would seem that the Constitutional Court feels very strongly about the fact that the local 
and provincial divisions of the Supreme Court should exercise the jurisdiction conferred on 




S 101(3) provides that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction over oenain constitutional matters within its 
area of jurisdiction, and in listing these matters, it effectively narrows the Constitutional Court's field 
of exclusive jurisdiction down to an inquiry into the constitutionality of an Act of Parliament; a dispute 
over the constitutionality of any Bill of Parliament; any dispute of a eonstitutional nature between 
organs of state, where at least one of the parties is an organ of state at the central government level; 
and the determination of questions whether any matter falls within its jurisdiction. 
S 101(6) goes even further in limiting areas over which the Constitutional Court has exclusive 
jurisdiction, by allowing the Supreme Court to hear mattecs falling within the exclusive jurisdiction of 
the Constitutional Court, where both parties to a dispute agree thereto. Appeals arising from matters 
referred to in section 101(3) and which relate to issues of constitutionality, will, however, still lie to 
the Constitutional Court. 
S 102(12) of the Interim Constitution reads that: 
3 
clearly from certain statements made by Kentridge AJ, for example the emphasis he placed 
on the fact that the jurisdiction conferred on the local and provincial divisions of the Supreme 
Court in terms of the Interim Constitution is not an "optional jurisdiction", but one conferred 
"in order to be exercised". 7 He also firmly stated that "even if a rapid resort to this Court 
were convenient, that would not relieve the Judge from making his own decision on a 
constitutional issue within his jurisdiction. "8 The only reason why the Constitutional Court 
consented to hear the matter, was because Mr TP McNally's9 application for direct access 
to the Court in terms of section 100(2)10 of the Interim Constitution, read with Rule 17(1) 
and 17(2) of the Constitutional Court Rules, 11 was granted. Even in a such a case, Kentridge 
AJ warned, direct access is "contemplated in only the most exceptional cases, and it is 
7 
• 
"Appeals wising from matters referred to in section 101(3) aod which relate to issues of 
ooostitutionality shall lie to the Constitutional Court. " (own italics) 
No mention, however, is made of matten referred to in section 101(6). Can this possibly mean that 
the Supreme Court is the court of fmal instance in a ooostitutiooal matter over whidt the Constitutional 
Court, strictly speaking, has exclusive jurisdiction, but for the fact that the parties to the dispute agreed 
to the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court? This is clearly undesirable, aod would seem to be one of the 
problems whidt should be addressed in the final ooostitution. 
The Woddng Draft of the Constitution already seems to go along way tow.-ds solving this problem, 
through the provision oontained in section 78(3)(b), which reads as follows: 
"Any fmding by a court that m Act of P.-liameot, [a Provincial Act) or my oonduct of the Pcesideot, 
is uoooostitutiooal has no force or effect unless oonfinned by the Constitutional Court; but, a court may 
grant a temporay interdict oc other temporay relief." (my italics) 
At 409 B-C • 
At 409 B. 
9 The Attomey-Geoeral for Natal. 
10 s 1 00(2) provides that: 
11 
"The rules of the Constitutional Court may make provision foc direct access to the Court 
where it is in the interest of justice to do so in respect of my matter over which it has 
jurisdiction." 
In terms of subrule (1) direct acooss will only be allowed in exceptional circumstanoes, under' whicb 
is undentood "a matter of such urgency, oc otherwise of such public importanoe, that the delay 
necessitated by the use of the ordinary procedures would prejudice the public interest oc prejudice the 
ends of justice aod good government. " Subrule (2) fucther provides that the above special procedure 
"may be sanctioned by the Court on application made to it in terms of these rules", as was the case 
inZwna. 
4 
certainly not intended to legitimate an incompetent reference" .12 
The matter of incompetent referrals has come before the Constitutional Court in a number 
of subsequent cases. 13 
In Mhlungu, 14 with regard to referrals to the Constitutional Court under section 1 02(1), 15 
Kentridge AJ pointed out that an issue which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court and arises in a provincial or local division of the Supreme Court does 
not necessitate an immediate referral to the Constitutional Court. He went further and held 
that even if the issue appears to be a substantial one, the Court hearing the case is required 
to refer it only: 
(1) if the issue is o:1e which may be decisive16 for the case; and 
(2) if it considers it to be in the interest of justice to do so. 17 
As far as decisiveness is concerned, Kentridge AJ laid down a general principle that "where 
it is possible to decide any case, civil or criminal, without reaching a constitutional issue, 18 
12 At 409 H (my italics). 
13 SeeS v Mhlungu 1995(7) BCLR 793 (CC); S v Vermaas; S v DuPlessis 1995(7) BCLR 851 (CC); and 
S v Zantsi CCI'/24194. 
14 See footnote 13 above. 
15 S 102(1) reads • follows: 
"If, in any matter before a provincial or local division of the Supreme Court, there is an issue 
which may be decisive for the case, and which falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the 
Constitutional Court in teems of section 98(2) and (3), the provincial or local division 
ooncemed shall, if it ooosiders it to be in the interest of justice to do so, refer such matter to 
the Constitutional Court for its decision: Provided that, if it is necessary for evidence to be 
heard for the purposes of deciding such issue, the provincial or local division ooncemed shall 
hear such evideooe and make a rmding theceoo, before referring the matter to the 
Constitutional Court." 
16 My italics. 
17 At 821 A-B. 
18 My italics. 
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that is the course which should be followed". 19 This principle is quoted with approval by 
Chaskalson P in the Zantsi case. 20 
Didcott J, in the Vermaas; DuPlessis case,21 came to the conclusion that the effect of section 
102(1) and 102(2) is that no division which has jurisdiction over a matter, may refer such 
a matter properly to the Constitutional Court while the litigation raising it remains in 
progress there. The judge hearing the case must decide the issue for him or herself, and it 
may only be presented to the Constitutional Court on appeal, once the litigation has ended 
in the court below. 
The Constitutional Court would seem to urge the judges of the local and provincial divisions 
of the Supreme Court to refrain from referring cases to the Constitutional Court ·as far as 
possible.· This can be done in two ways: 
(1) by judging the issues before them on a non-constitutional basis, as far as possible; 
(2) by making their own decisions regarding constitutional issues falling within their 
jurisdiction. 
The Working Draft of the Constitution seems to have taken these pointers laid down by the 
Constitutional Court into consideration. Although it does not specifically contain a clause 
along these lines, no provision is made for referrals to the Constitutional Court by the 
Supreme Court, as per section 102(1) of the Interim Constitution. It does contain provisions 
to the effect that findings of the Supreme Court on the constitutionality of matters over which 
the Constitutional Court has the final jurisdiction, will be of no force or effect unless 
confirmed by the Constitutional Court. 22 The implicit condition that the specific division of 
the Supreme Court must first reach its own decision, which will then only be confirmed by 
the Constitutional Court can be deduced from these provisions. 
1
' At 821 F. 
20 See footnote 13 above. 
21 See footnote 13 above. 
22 S 77(2) ~b) and s 78(3)(b) of the Working Draft. 
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4 CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 
4.1 Principles regarding constitutional interpretation laid down in the Zu11Ul case 
In his interpretation of section 25 of Chapter 3 of the Interim Constitution, Kentridge AJ, 
after having examined numerous cases, locally and abroad23 in which applicable principles 
were formulated and applied, laid down at least . nine general principles regarding 
constitutional interpretation: 
(1) A constitution calls for "a generous inte7pretation24 ••• suitable to give to individuals 
the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to ... "25 
(2) The interpretation of a constitution differs from the interpretation of a statute; a 
constitution calls for "principles of interpretation of its own". 26 
(3) In the interpretation of a constitution, regard must be had to the legal history, 
traditions and usages of the country concerned, if the pu7posesZl of its constitution 
are be fully understood. 28 
23 Eg, Nyamakazi v President of Bophuthatswana 1994(1) BCLR 92 (B); Khala v The Minister of SafdJ' 
and Security 1994(2) BCLR 89 (W); Minister of Home Affairs (Bermuda) v Fisher (1980) AC 319 
(PC); S v Marwane 1982(3) SA 717 (A); Minister of Defence, Namibia v Mwandinghi 1992(2) SA 355 
(NrnSC); R v Big M Drug Mart Ltd (1985) 18 DLR (4th); Attorney-General v Moagi 1982(2) Botswana 
LR 124; and Qozoleni v Minister of Law and Order 1994(1) BCLR 75 (E). 
The reference to foreign case law is in accordance with the provisions of the Interim Constitution, and 
specifically s 35(1), which provides that: 
"In interpreting the provisions of this Olaptec a court of law ... may have regard to comparable 
foreign case law." 
24 My italica. 
25 From the well-known judgment of Lord Wilbecforce in the Privy Council in Minister of Home Affairs 
(Bermuda) v Fisher (see footnote 23 above) at 328-9. 
26 See footnote 25 above. 
r~ My italics. 
28 At 411 E. 
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(4) A constitution must be interpreted, so as "to give clear expression to the value? it 
seeks to nurture for a future South Africa". 30 
(5) The Constitution, as the supreme law31 against which all law is to be tested, 32 must 
be examined "with a view to extracting from it those principles or values33 against 
which such law ... can be measured". 34 
(6) The above principles do not entail that the principles which were applicable in our 
courts of law up to now, are to be ignored, as they can still be of considerable value. 
(7) Nor do the above principles mean that the language35 of the Constitution should be 
neglected. When interpreting a constitution, one should always be aware of the 
values underlying the constitution, while keeping in mind that it is a written 
instrumenf6 that is being interpreted. As Kentridge AJ put it very strongly: " ... the 
Constitution does not mean whatever we might wish it to mean", 37 and "a constitution 
embodying fundamental rights should as far as its language permits be given a broad 
construction". 38 
29 My italics. 







The supremacy of the Constitution is oooinmed, in acoordanoe with s 4(1) of the Interim Constitution, 
wbkh specifically states that: 
"This Constitution shall be the supreme law of the Republic and any law Ol" act inconsistent 
with its provisions shall, unless otherwise provided expressly Ol" by necessary implication in 
this Constitution, be of no force and effect to the extent of the inconsistency." 
My italics. 
See footnote 30 above. 
My italics. 
My italics. 
37 At 412 G. 
38 From Atromey-General v Moagi (see footnote 23 above) at 184. 
This is similar to the warning issued by Van Dijkhorst in De Klerk v Du Plessis 1994(6) BCLR 124(T) 
at 128 E-F, namely: 
" ... a free floating interpretation unanchored in the aims of the Constitution ... might lead to 
interpretation based on personal predilections and prefecences. In interpreting the Constitution 
8 
(8) In interpreting the Constitution, the courts must have regard to, amongst other things, 
foreign case law, as per section 35(2) of the Interim Constitution. 
(9) Where the Constitution itself, however, provides criteria which ought to be applied 
in the interpretation of a specific clause, these should be used. The South Mrican 
Constitution should therefore not be forced into, for example, the Canadian mould, 
as far as the interpretation of certain provisions is concerned. 39 
The rules of constitutional interpretatioii !aid down by Kentridge AJ in Zuma, confirm certain 
pre-1994 decisions. 40 The question now arising is how they accord with the views of authors 
in the field, the interpretation provisions of the Constitution itself, and subsequent decisions 
of the Court? 
4.2 Interpreting statutes and constitutions 
In recent years South Mrican legal literature has seen a spate of new publications on 
statutory interpretation, 41 advocating a number of fresh approaches. In the most recent work, 
Devenish42 collects the different approaches under headings such as: the literal theory; the 
subjective theory; the purposive theory; the teleological or value-coherent theory; the judicial 
one should guard against using it like a ventriloquist's dununy, making it uttec what you want 
to hear. That dangec lurks in applying as a yardsticlc: in interpretation such phrases as 
• generous approach' whidl might tempt one to read into the text of the Constitution one's own 
social prefeceoces and subjective sympathies." 
39 At 419 J K.entridge AJ makes a statement in this regard with speciilC refel"eelCe to the genecal limitation 
clause, whidl itself sets out the aiteria whidl should be applied in the intecpretation theceof. In the 
words of Kentridge AJ: " •.. I see no reason, in this case at least, to attempt to fit our analysis into the 
Canadian pattern." 
40 Eg, S v Marwane 1982(3) SA 717 (A); Minister of Defence, Namibia v Mwandinghi 1992(2) SA 355 
(NmSC); Altomey-General v Moagi 1982(2) Botswana LR 124; and N)'Q.I'IIJkazi v President of 
Boplulthatswana 1994(1) BCLR 92 (B). 
-41 Botha, CJ Statutory Interpretation: An introduction for students (1991); Devenish, GE Interpretation 
of Statutes (1992); DuPlessis, LM The Interpretation of Statutes (1986). 
-42 See footnote 41 above at 25-55. 
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or free theory; the objective or delegation theory; and nonnative transposition. 
Despite the differences in terminology a broad distinction can be drawn between a literal (or 
textual) and a contextual approach. 43 
The literal approach holds that the true meaning of the text can be found virtually exclusively 
in the words used by the legislature, which are then equated with the meaning of the 
legislature. The interpreter of the text may deviate from the ordinary grammatical meaning 
of these words in exceptional circumstances only, namely in order to avoid absurdity and to 
resolve ambiguity. This approach leaves no room for interpreters of statutes to question the 
morality of statutes; they are only required to find the literal meaning of the specific Act, and 
to apply it as such. As the literal approach is derived from the theory of sovereignty of 
Parliament, it is doubtful whether it will be of much value in the new South Africa, where 
the sovereignty of Parliament has been replaced by a supreme constitution. This does not 
mean however, that the ghost of literalism (in what ever guise) might not from time to time 
haunt the constitutional interpreter - as would appear to be the case from Kentridge AJ' s 
minority decision in Mhlungu. 44 
The contextual approach distinguishes, broadly speaking, between a purposive and a 
teleological theory. 
The purposive theory, according to Devenish, 45 adopts the objective concept of 'purpose' and 
does away with the idea of the 'intention of the legislature', as legislative purpose is regarded 
to be far more objective. The application of this theory requires that "interpretation should 
not depend exclusively on the literal meaning of words ", but that the interpreter should make 
use of "an unqualified contextual approach, 4 which allows an unconditional examination of 
.u As Botha did (see footnote 41 above) at 10. 
44 S v Mhlungu 1995(7) BCLR 793 (CC). See discussioo in par 4.3. 
45 See footnote 41 above at 35. 
46 My italics. 
10 
all internal and external sources. "47 Unfortunately Devenish does not explain what 
is to be understood under the concepts "unqualified contextual approach" or "all internal and 
external sources. " 
At frrst glance, the teleological or value-coherent theory, does not seem to be that different 
from the purposive theory. Closer scrutiny reveals, however, that it contains another 
element, namely that of 'equity'. In this way equity is used as another aid to establish the 
purpose of legislation. Devenish' s concurrence with Eskridge's criticism against 
"purposivism", 48 namely that it cannot be accepted as a general theory "because it neglects 
other critically important values, "49 clearly shows that the major distinction between these 
two theories lies in the fact that the purposive theory, in establishing the purpose of 
legislation, is concerned with context in an narrower sense. The teleological theory on the 
other hand, takes a much broader view through its involvement with vaguer concepts such 
as the prevailing values and norms in a specific society, as well as equity - all of which 
should be kept in mind when trying to ascertain what the purpose of legislation is. The 
teleological theory is therefore wider than the purposive theory, as it takes into account the 
vaguer, more general purposes of law, such as justice and security. As its name indicates, 
this theory is based on a value system. 
It is clear that the literal or textual approach will be of little or no value in interpreting the 
new Constitution, which reigns supreme. Time and time again, since April1994, the word 
"purposive" has been used by the courts in the context of the Constitution. 50 
This term is not found in the Constitution itself. The most direct guide to the interpretation 
of the Constitution and Chapter 3 in particular is section 35 with its reference to the values 
~ See footnote 41 above at 36. 
• See footnote 41 above at 38. 
• My italics. 
50 S V Gqozo 1994(1) BCLR 10 (Ck); Ntenteni v Chairman, C~i Council of State 1994(1) BCLR 168 
(Ck); Khala v Minister of Safety and Security 1994(2) BCLR 125 (W); Rattigan v Chief Immigration 
Offu;er 1995(1) BCLR l(Ck);and Baloro v University of Bophuthatswana 1995(8) BCLR 1018 (B). 
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which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality. 51 It would 
appear that for the courts "purposive interpretation" includes "value interpretation". 
Du Plessis and De Ville52 are of the opinion that section 35(1) "opens the door to the 
evolution of a teleological hermeneutic" and welcome this approach as it allows for the 
interpretive adaptation of the human rights norms enshrined in the chapter to constantly 
changing circumstances." They distinguish between intra- and extra-textual contextualisation, 
and defme intra-contextualisation as interpreting the Constitution in relation to the broader 
text, for example the preamble; schedules; and the long title of the Constitution. 
Extra-contextualisation, on the other hand, takes note of external factors, for example the 
prevailing values in a society. 
Kruger53 calls intra- and extra-contextualisation the written and the unwritten text of the 
Constitution. The unwritten text contains the implied values inherent to and underlying the 
written Constitution, and forms and inextricable part of the Constitution. 
What is clear from the above is that when trying to establish the purpose behind certain 
provisions, everybody agrees that constitutional interpretation demands that account be had 
of values and norms. In the combined terminology of court and writers a purposive approach 
is followed, refmed to a teleological approach by the acknowledgement of values. In this 
regard one is tempted to agree with Kroon and Froneman, JJ in Qozoleni v Minister of Law 
51 The 1993 Interim Constitution contains a specif'lc intecpretatioo clause, namely s 35. S 35(1) deals 
with the intecpretation of Olaptec 3 of the Interim Constitution speciiteally and reads 11 follows: 
"(1) In interpreting the provisions of this Olapter a court of law shall promote the values 
which underlie an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality and 
shall, where applicable, have regard to public international law applicable to the 
p-otectioo of the rights entrenched in this Olapter, and may have regard to 
comparable foreign case law." 
52 Du Plessis, LM and De Ville, JR "Bill of Rights intecpretation in the South Mrican context (3): 
53 
Comparative pecspectives and future prospects" 1993 3 Stell LR 357 at 389. 
Kruger, 1 "Regspositivisme en die 'ongeskrewe teks' van die (nuwe) grondwet" 1991 SA Public Law 
231. 
12 
and Order,54 where they state that: 
"In my view it serves little purpose to characterise the propec approach to coostitutional interpretation 
as libecal, generous, purposive or the like. These labels do not in themselves assist in the 
interpretation process and carry the danger of introducing concepts or notions associated with them 
which may not find expression in the Constitution itself. Far more useful is to recognise that because 
the Constitution is the supreme law of the land against which all law or conduct is to be tested, it must 
be examined with a view to extracting from it those principles or values55 against which such law or 
conduct can be measured. " 
In what follows the term "purposive" will be used to describe the process that has just been 
described. However, one should caution with Du Plessis and Corder, 56 that current 
terminology is not very helpful. They doubt, for example, whether the reference to 
"purposive" is feasible in practical terms, as the purpose of any written instrument can only 
be determined after it has indeed been interpreted. A better term, according to them, would 
be "purpose-seeking", which would, besides teleological interpretation,57 58 also include 
grammatical, systematic, historical, and comparative interpretation. For them, teleological 
interpretation is nothing more than an aid when applying a purposive or purpose-seeking 
approach. 
Besides a purposive interpretation, Kentridge .AJ also endorsed a "generous approach" in 
Zuma. The next question concerns the relationship between "purposive" and "generous" 
in~rpretation. 
1994(1) BCLR 75 (E) at 80 D. 
55 My italics. 
56 DuPlessis and Corder Undentanding South Africa's Transitional Bill of Rigltts (1994). 
57 My italic~. 
Du Plessis and Corder delme teleological interpretation as follows: 
" .•. the determination of the ratio legis or the 'intention of a hypothetically permanent 
coostitutioo-maker', as it is sometimes also referred to, thereby acknowledging the directive 
influence of 'present circumstances' on an understanding of the coostitutional text- it is, in 
other words, a purposive, or rather purpose-seeking method of interpretation. " 
13 
In Phato; Commissioner of South African Police Services v Attorney-General, Eastern Cape59 
Jones J held that a purposive approach is not necessarily the same as a generous approach. 
In his discussion of this decision, Jagwanth60 summarized the reasoning of Jones J as follows: 
(1) A purposive approach to interpretation need not be a liberal or generous approach, 
but could also be restrictive, depending on the purpose of the right in question. 
(2) In support of this statement, he quoted the Canadian author, Peter Hogg,61 who states 
that a generous interpretation might overlook the purpose of a right and include 
behaviour that is unworthy of constitutional protection. 
(3) A generous approach to interpretation is not reconcilable with the stringent standard 
of justification required by the limitation clause. 
(4) A narrow interpretation should be given to rights while maintaining the stringent 
standard of justification called for by the limitation clause, rather than a wide 
interpretation with a more relaxed standard of justification. 
The key to the relationship between "purposive" and "generous" would seem to lie in the fact 
that a constitution should not be regarded as ordinary legislation. It is a document which 
requires "principles of interpretation of its own "62 - a phrase quoted with approval by 
Kentridge AJ and a viewpoint which the majority of commentators seem to share. 63 
A viable solution would be to follow a generous interpretation, but only to the extent that it 
1994(2) SACR 734 (E). 
60 Jagwanth, S "Constitutional Application" SACJ (1995) 8 69 at 72. 
61 Hogg, P Constitutional Law of Canada (1992) at 814-5. 
6Z See footnote 25 above. 
63 Eg, Krugec (Kruger, 1 "Regspositivisme en die 'ongeskrewe teks' van die (nuwe) groodwet" 1991 SA 
Public Law 229 at 233), who also referred to and approved of the well-known quotation from the 
Fisher case; DuPlessis and De Ville (DuPlessis, LM and De Ville, 1R "Bill of rights intecpretatioo 
in the South African oootext (1): Diagnostic observations" 1993 1 Stell LR 63), who agreed with the 
much-quoted passage from Hunter eta/ v Southam Inc ([1984) 11 DLR (4th) 641 (SCC) at 649), 
where it was stated that: "'The task of expounding a ooostitutioo is aucially different from that of 
ooostruing a statute."; Van Rensburg (Van Rensburg, 1M "Interpretation and limitation of fundamental 
rights" 1995 (vol30 no 2) The Magistrate 63 at 64), who expressly stated that the intecpretatioo of a 
ooostitution diffecs from the interpretation of a statute; and Marcus (Marcus, G "lntecpreting the 
chapter on fundamental rights" 1994 SATHR 92 at 93), who is also of the opinion that a ooostitution 
is a <ioc'Jil1ellt which enjoys a status diffecing from that of ordinary statutes. 
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would not defeat the purpose of the relevant provision, and as far as it is in accordance with 
the language of the Constitution. 
In this regard 11 generous interpretation 11 can be seen purely as a warning that the courts 
should steer clear of a too literal or textual approach, especially if one has to reconcile it 
with the fact that great emphasis is placed on the fact that a constitution remains a written 
instrument which is interpreted. 
The approach advocated in Zuma would seem to fall somewhere between a strictly purposive 
and a purely generous approach - which is acceptable in light of the fact that the Constitution 
is held to be a sui generis document to which the ordinary principles of statutory 
interpretation need not be applied. 
4.3 Adherence to the principles regarding constitutional interpretation formulated in 
Zuma, in subsequent Constitutional Court decisions 
Whether the principles formulated by Kentridge AJ in Zuma are of lasting value can only be 
established in light of subsequent decisions of the Constitutional Court. 
In the second judgment of the Constitutional Court, S v Mhlungu, 64 the main judgment 
expounding the majority view followed the principles laid down in Zuma. They65 held that 
an interpretation was to be preferred which gave force and effect to the fundamental 
objectives and aspirations of the Constitution, and which was less arbitrary in consequence. 
This is clearly a value-orientated judgment, and one in which it is mentioned that this 
interpretation is possible because the language of the relevant provision, namely section 
241 (8), permits such an interpretation. 
It is interesting to note, however, that Kentridge AJ who formulated and applied these 
64 1995(7) BCLR 793 (CC). 
65 Mahomed 1 delivered this judgment, in which Madala, Mokgoro, O'Regan and Langa 11 OOI'lCUITed. 
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principles in Zuma, ignored them in the minority judgment in the Mhlungu case. In this case 
he leaned towards a literal approach, holding that the language of the section was clear and 
therefore had to be given effect, and even referring to what the framers of the Constitution 
intended with this section. This is not at all in keeping with what was said by him in Zuma. 
Fortunately this was only a minority judgment. 
In S v Williams66 the Court also confirmed that "in interpreting the rights enshrined in 
Chapter 3 of the Constitution, a purposive app~h should be adopted. " 
The judgment on the unconstitutionality of the death sentence, S v Malcwanyane, 67 is 
interspersed with references to concepts such as the values prevailing in a society, the 
historical background against which this judgment is delivered, and the idea of ubuntu which 
appears in the post-amble to the Constitution and refers to ideas such as humaneness, social 
justice and fairness. It would therefore appear that the Constitutional Court definitely 
proposes a value-orientated approach towards the interpretation of the Constitution. 
Whether this approach will develop in something so liberal as to not have any bearing on the 
language of the Constitution, but be based on purely subjective 'values', remains to be seen. 
It is hoped not, and in light of Didcott J noting this danger clearly, and assuring that 
" ••. courts of law ... whose training and experience warns them against the trap of undue 
subjectivity", 68 our hopes need not be groundless. 
5 REVERSE ONUS PROVISIONS AND THE RIGHT TO A FAIR TRIAL 
The constitutionality of section 217(1) (b) (ii) was attacked on the ground that it was 
66 1995(7) BCLR 861 (CC) at 878 F. 
67 1995(6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
68 See footnote 67 above at 734 A. 
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unconstitutional, being in conflict with section 25 of the Constitution. 69 
Although the presumption of innocence, the right of silence and proscription of compelled 
confessions are not strange or new concepts to the South Mrican law, it was necessary to 
confirm them in the Constitution, by the inclusion of section 25, as they have all "to a 
greater or lesser degree been eroded by statute and in some cases by judicial decision. "70 
Kentridge AJ pointed out that section 217(1)(b)(ii) creates a legal presumption, with the legal 
burden of rebuttal on the accused- the so-called "reverse onus". The legitimacy of these 
kinds of provision has been examined by many courts abroad, all of democratic societies, and 
the conclusion reached was that these types of provision are neither uncommon nor 
necessarily unconstitutional. 
In his interpretation of section 25 of the Interim Constitution, Kentridge AJ also came to the 
conclusion that the right to a fair trial embraces more than that set out in section 25(3) (a)-fj), 
and referred to a concept of substantive fairness, in contrast to formalistic fairness which was 
acceptable in criminal courts before the adoption of the Interim Constitution. 
He also indicated that although the provisions of section 25 are more specific than any of the 
69 The particular provisions of section 25 whidl were relied on, are the following: 
"25 (2) Every person arrested for the alleged commission of an offence shall ..• have the right 
(a) promptly to be informed, in a language which be or she undentands, that 
be or she has the right to remain silent and to be warned of the 
consequences of making any statement; 
(c) not to be compelled to make a oonfession or admission whidl oould be used 
in evidence against him or her'; and 
(3) Every accused person shall have the right to a fair trial, whidl shall include the right 
70 At 410 D. 
(c) to be presumed innocent and to remain silent during plea proceedings or 
trial and not to testify during trial; 
(d) to adduce and challenge evidence, and not to be a compellable witness 
against himself or herself . " 
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other provisions of Chapter 3, they still lead to some problems of interpretation. 
He proceeded to solve these problems by first examining the general principles applicable 
to constitutional interpretation, 71 and then by researching the application of similar provisions 
in other countries, for example the United States of America and Canada. 
In both of these countries, the courts struggled to reconcile the presumption of innocence 
with the reversal of the onus. They provided different solutions to this problem, for example 
in the United States the Supreme Court formulated a test for the validity of such a 
presumption72 in Tot v The United States,13 namely that there must be a: 
"rational coonectioo between the facts proved and the fact presumed ... But where the infeceooe is so 
strained as not to have a reasonable relation to the circumstances of life as we know them it is not 
competent for the legislature to create it as a rule governing the procedure of the courts." 
Twenty five years later, in Leary v United States14 the court formulated a stricter test, in 
saying that: 
"a aiminal statutory presumption must be regarded as 'irrational' or 'arbitrary' and hence 
unconstitutional, unless it can at least be said with substantial assurance that the presumed fact is more 
likely than not to flow from the proved fact on wbid:t it is made to depend." 
Kentridge AJ feels that rational connection is a "useful" screening test, but not a "conclusive" 
one. He substantiates this viewpoint with a quote by Stevens J from County Court of Ulster 
County, New York et al v Allen et al, 75 where he said that: 
71 See discussion in par 4.1 above. 
72 As in s 217(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act. 
73 319 us 463 (1943). 
74 395 us 6 (1969). 
75 442 us 140 (1979). 
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"since the prosecution bears the burden of establishing guilt, it may not rest its case entirely on a 
presumption unless the fact proved is sufficient to support the infeceoce of guilt beyond reasonable 
doubt. " 
He then turns to Canadian jurisprudence, where the rational connection test has also arisen, 
but in a way which is considered more useful for the South Mclean situation, as section 1 
of the Canadian Charter has a limitation clause analogous to section 33 of the South Mclean 
Constitution. 
Section 1 of the Canadian Charter calls for a "two-stage" approach, namely an enquiry into 
whether a fundamental right has been infringed upon, and if so, whether this infringement 
is justified under or "saved" by the limitation clause. 
Kentridge AJ examines the application of the two-stage approach to the particular question 
of reverse onus provisions in three Canadian cases, 76 all of which held tha! such a 
presumption is a violation of the right to the presumption of innocence. 
He then applies the frrst three of seven principles formulated by the Canadian Supreme Court 
in R v Downey,71 78 and eventually comes to the conclusion that section 217(1)(b)(ii) is in 
conflict with section 25 of the Constitution, as: 
1li R v Oakes (1986) 26 DLR (4th) 200; R v Whyte (1988) 51 DLR (4th) 481; and R v Downey 90 DLR 
(4th) 449. 
Tl See footnote 76 above. 
71 These three principles are: 
(1) The presumption of innocence is infringed whenever the accused is liable to be oonvicted 
despite the existence of a reasonable doubt. 
(2) H by the provisions of a statutory presumption an accused is required to establish, that is to 
say to prove or disprove, on a balance of probabilities either an element of an offence or an 
excuse, then it oontravenes section 11 (d). Such a provision would permit a oonviction in spite 
of a reasonable doubt. 
(3) Even if a rational connection exists between the established fact and the fact to be presumed, 
this would be insufficient to make valid a preswnption requiring the accused to disprove an 
element of the offence. 
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(1) The common law rule on the burden of proving that a confession was made 
voluntarily, is an essential part of some of the rights contained in section 25 of the 
Interim Constitution, namely the right to remain silent after arrest, the right not to be 
compelled to make a confession, and the right against self-incrimination. 
(2) These rights are furthermore a necessary reinforcement of the so-called "golden 
thread", namely that the prosecution has to prove the guilt of the accused beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
(3) If the burden of proof is reversed, as is the case with reverse onus provisions, all 
these rights are undermined. The reverse onus provision contained in section 
217(1)(b)(ii) further lays a much more difficult burden of proof on the accused, 
namely they have to discharge the onus on a balance of probabilities. 
(4) The common law rule regarding the burden of proof is inherent to the rights listed 
in section 25 and forms part of the right to a fair trial. 
6 APPLICATION OF THE GENERAL LIMITATION CLAUSE 
The Interim Constitution contains a general limitation clause in section 33(1). According to 
this provision, the limitation of fundamental rights will be constitutional if the requirements 
set out therein are met. 
In Zuma the state submitted, in the alternative, that if it is decided that section 217(1)(b)(ii) 
is unconstitutional, it is saved by section 33(1) of the Interim Constitution. 79 
79 General limitation clauses have already been the subject of numerous decisions, eg S v Makwanyane 
1995(6) BCLR (CC); Matinkinca v Council of State, Ciskei 1994(1) BCLR 17 (Ck); S v Majavu 
1994(2) BCLR 56 (CkGD); Khala v Minister of Safety and Security 1994(2) BCLR 89 (W); and 
Kauesa v Minister of Home Affairs 1994(3) BCLR 1 (NmH), and of numerous comments, eg De Ville, 
J "Intecpretation of the general limitation clause in the chapter on fundamental rights" 1994 SA Public 
Law 287; Devenish, G "An examination and aitique of the limitation provision of the bill of rights 
oontained in the Interim Constitution" 1995SA Public Law 131; Van Reosburg, JM "Interpretation and 
limitation of fundamental rights" 1995 The Magistrate 63; and Woolman, S "Riding the push-me pull-
you: constructing a test that reconciles the conflicting interests which animate the limitation clause" 
1994 SAJHR 60. 
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With regard to the application of limitations, we can draw the following conclusions from 
what Kentridge AJ decided: 
(1) Zuma confirms that the two-stage approach, as set out in the Canadian case of R v 
Oakes, 80 will be followed. This approach is applied by posing two questions, namely: 
(i) Has a fundamental right entrenched in the Constitution been infringed? 
(ii) If the answer is 'yes', does this infringement comply with all the requirements 
of the limitation clause, and is therefore 'saved' by it? 
(2) Once again the Court referred to the Canadian model, but decided that section 33(1) 
itself sets out the criteria which ought to be applied, and that a mechanical application 
of Canadian jurisprudence is not always required. 
(3) The tests of reasonableness, justifiability and necessity are not identical and in 
applying each of them individually, one might not always arrive at the same result. 
In certain instaaces, they may, however, be assessed together, as was the case in 
Zuma. 
(4) The fact that the limitation of a right is merely 'convenient' would not be sufficient 
to justify the infringement under section 33(1). 
It was held by the Court that section 217(1)(b)(ii) does not meet the requirements listed in 
section 33(1). 
7 CONCLUSION - THE VALUE OF THE ZUMA CASE 
The Zuma case, as the first judgment of the Constitutional Court, is of considerable value 
with regard to certain basic principles which should be followed when approaching the 
Constitution, and more specifically, Chapter 3 dealing with fundamental human rights. 
These can be summarized as follows: 
(1) Provincial and local divisions of the Supreme Court should make an effort to alleviate 
80 1986 2.6 DLR (4th) 200. 
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the work-load of the Constitutional Court, by refraining from making incompetent 
referrals to the Constitutional Court. 
(2) In the interpretation of the Constitution, and more specifically Chapter 3, a 
value-orientated approach should be followed. Care should be taken, however, that 
this approach does not degenerate into purely subjective value judgments. 
(3) Although the Constitution clearly requires a purposive approach in its interpretation, 
it should never be forgotten that this is in fact a written instrument, of which the 
language cannot be disregarded. 
(4) It was held that the "fair trial" encompassed in section 25 of the Interim Constitution, 
goes further than the traditional view of procedural or formal fairness, and embraces 
a concept of substantive or material fairness. 
(5) The presumption in section 217(1)(b)(ii) of the Criminal Procedure Act was held to 
be unconstitutional. Kentridge AJ took pains, however, to point out that this decision 
does not mean that all legal presumptions can now be regarded as unconstitutional. 
This finding, albeit formally correct, offers cold comfort to many government 
institutions operating with statutes containing presumably invalid presumptions. It 
leaves them with the option of approaching Parliament with a general law amendment 
Act to remove such presumptions, or waiting for an appropriate case to serve before 
the Constitutional Court. A solution may be a provision in the fmal constitution 
analogous to section 87(c), read with section 79(2), of the Namibian Constitution. 
This section gives the Attorney-General the power to approach the court for the ruling 
on the constitutionality of any matter. 81 In the South African context this power could 
be given to the Minister of Justice. 
(6) In accordance with section 35(1) of the Interim Constitution, the Court liberally 
referred to comparable foreign case law. It was stated, however, that where the 
South African Constitution sets out criteria which ought to be applied, the specific 
case should not be forced to fit the pattern of foreign case law. This approach was 
consistently followed in subsequent decisions of the Constitutional Court. 
81 The best-known example of the execcise of this powec is Ex parte AJ/Qrney-General: In re oorporal 
punishment by organs of state 1991(3) SA 76 (NmSC). This powec is not totally unknown in South 
African law. In teems of s 385 of the Criminal Procedure Act 56 of 1955, the Minister of Justice had 
the }X''Vec to approach the court for an "abstract" ruling on a legal question. 
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(7) The application of the two-stage approach regarding the limitation of fundamental 
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